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In recent years, the Arctic region has aroused increasing international in-terest. This interest has predominantly been reflected in extensive mediacoverage bringing attention to the area’s abundant resources, border-re-
lated stakes, and the possible opening of new maritime routes. (1) Located
north of the polar circle, the region comprises a large number of seas, and
borders eight countries. Among the latter, five are located along the Arctic
Ocean – Canada, Russia, the United States, Norway, and Denmark (via
Greenland). (2) New climatological conditions have created promising
geostrategic opportunities for countries bordering the region, anticipating
that the creation of a new trade route from north to east could lead to sig-
nificant commercial profits and increase access to natural resources for eco-
nomic growth purposes. As implied by extant analyses, such a route would
be shorter and would facilitate trade flows compared to existing alternatives
via the Suez Canal. (3)
Yet, interest in the region does not stop at circumpolar states. Other coun-
tries see a number of geostrategic opportunities and stakes involved in ac-
cessing the Arctic. China, which lacks a legal basis to articulate claims over
access to the region, has nonetheless been increasingly present. (4) In recent
years and despite a lack of experience in researching the area, Beijing has
succeeded in conducting a vast scientific Arctic research program in the
fields of climatology, geology, and biology, among others. Moreover, Beijing
has mobilised considerable efforts towards the building of political and eco-
nomic ties with smaller Arctic countries such as Norway and Iceland, and
has brought Arctic-related questions to its diplomatic agenda with Russia
and Canada. (5)
These efforts on the part of China since 2009 have engendered negative
reactions on the part of the Western media, which portray China as am-
bitious, greedy, and ready to conquer and threaten the territorial sover-
eignty of countries in the Arctic region. Examples commonly cited of such
attempts include the sudden appearance of China’s research icebreaker
in Tuktoyaktuk (Northwest Territories, Canada) in 1999. Claims that the
icebreaker’s presence was unexpected served as a pretext to accuse China
of suspect motivations in the area. (6)Yet in reality the Chinese government
had submitted to the Canadian Embassy in Beijing a formal request to
enter the area. (7) Chinese admiral Yin Zhuo’s assertion that arctic resources
are a world heritage (8) was nonetheless cited as evidence of the duplicity
of the Chinese government, whose ambitions in the Arctic would threaten
the interests of Canada and other countries bordering the region. (9)
Discussions over potential natural resource reserves in the area and the
opening of new trade routes have led to multiple speculation over the in-
tentions of regional and world powers, increasingly concerned about their
economies’ dependence on energy security. In the context of these debates,
our analysis provides a general overview of China’s scientific and political
presence in the Arctic, as well as its official policy and potential future
strategies towards the latter.
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China’s presence in the Arctic
Until recently, China’s growing presence in the Arctic remained unnoticed,
even in a context of increasing international competition for control over
the region as a result of climate change. In spite of a number of reports and
news media articles covering the topic, few academic studies had been ded-
icated to China’s policy priorities in the Arctic. (10) A report published by the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2010 entitled
“China Prepares for An Ice-free Arctic” (11) was one of the first studies to ad-
dress the issue. It attracted considerable attention on the part of an inter-
national community becoming aware of China’s aspiration to become one
of the main geopolitical actors in the Arctic and to take an active part in
the management of its natural resources.
Moreover, searches in China’s largest database, Wanfang Data,(12) re-
vealed that more than a hundred studies by mainland Chinese researchers
had already been published on the Arctic region across a number of dis-
ciplines. While articles published between 1996 and 2008 predominantly
pertained to ecology-related matters (i.e., climate change and tempera-
ture shifts in the Arctic, biodiversity, etc.), (13) publications in the past five
years have mostly touched on the role that the region could play in
China’s future economic growth and geostrategic interests. (14)
A significant polar research program
China’s interest in the Arctic was not exclusively manifested by an increase
in academic studies on the region, but was also reflected in its expanding
presence in the area. In 1992, before the possibility of new trade routes in
the region was even raised, Beijing had organised jointly with the German
universities of Kiel and Bremen its first five-year scientific research program
in the Arctic Ocean. This project was subsequently followed by China’s entry
into the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) in 1996. Founded
in 1990, the organisation is comprised of 18 countries, and its main mission
consists of promoting research cooperation on the Arctic. The main objec-
tive of the Chinese research program in the area has been the study of in-
teractions between the Ice Arctic Ocean, sea ice, and the atmosphere. With
the help of a supporting database and some samples, China has also sought
to learn more about the impact of abnormal temperature changes in the
North Pole on China’s climate. (15)
The purchase in the Ukraine in 1994 of an icebreaker (polar class 5(16)) called
Xuelong雪龙, or Snow Dragon, (17) enabled China to become one of the active
independent researchers in the polar area, and to organise a large number of
scientific expeditions in the Arctic and Antarctic (see picture 1). Coordinated
by the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA), (18) these research
projects have reached a significant scale. In addition to 27 expeditions in the
Antarctic, China has conducted four expeditions in the Arctic (in 1999, 2003,
2008, and 2010). It has also founded its first station in 2004. Called Yellow
River (黃河), the station is located in Ny-Alesund on the Island of Spitsbergen
in Norway. In 2009, the Chinese government made the decision to improve
its fleet’s capacity by launching the industrial production of Chinese icebreak-
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Picture 1: The poster for World Ocean Day shows the
Chinese icebreaker Xuelong, State Oceanic Administration,
Beijing, 10 December 2012.
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ers. The first flagship will be built by 2013. It will be an 8,000-ton vessel and
will be able to break through 1.5 metres of ice (polar class 4). (19)
China’s economic diplomacy towards Scandinavian
countries and Russia
In conjunction with the above scientific initiatives, the Chinese govern-
ment has developed several political and economic partnerships with Arctic
countries, including Norway in 2001, Denmark in 2010, and Iceland in 2010.
While China has been actively developing bilateral cooperation with most
European countries, it has placed a particular emphasis on Scandinavian
countries given the importance of their markets. Cooperative agreements
were signed mainly in the areas of Arctic navigation, natural resource ex-
traction, academic exchanges, and joint research. Furthermore, agreements
resulted in support for China’s application to become a permanent observer
at the Arctic Council, a regional intergovernmental forum that promotes
cooperation and exchanges among Arctic countries. (20) While the application
was submitted in 2007, it was reviewed by the Council in 2009, along with
those of South Korea and the European Union. Norway, Canada, and Russia
rejected the European Union’s demand and granted the other two countries
the temporary status of ad hoc observers pending the next review of appli-
cations. Since then, Beijing has conducted an intensive diplomatic and eco-
nomic self-promotion campaign among Scandinavian countries. It has
emphasised the importance of a partnership, particularly in the area of nat-
ural resource extraction. Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland have expressed their
full support to the integration of China within the Arctic Council. While Nor-
way initially expressed greater restraint vis-à-vis China’s integration, espe-
cially following the controversy regarding the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize
awarded to Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, it nonetheless confirmed that it
would support China’s application. (21)
In May 2010, Denmark hosted a first delegation of Chinese investors and
entrepreneurs. The latter signed multiple contracts and letters of intention
in the areas of energy, green economy, agriculture, and food security. The
total value of such agreements was estimated at US$740 million. (22) China
also seeks to expand its mining activities in Greenland. Starting in 2015, the
British corporation London Mining plans to produce an annual amount of 15
million tons of iron ore concentrate (magnetite) originating from Isua’s mine,
in partnership with Sinosteel and China Communications Construction Corp.
Greenland Minerals and Energy has estimated that the Kvanefjeld Mine could
produce 20 percent of the demand in rare earth elements and significant
amounts of uranium starting in 2016. (23) Kvanefjeld’s ability to influence
world market prices makes it a strategic project for Chinese corporations
such as Inner Mongolia Baotou Steel Rare Earth, which has already reached
the status of number one rare earth element producer. (24)
Ever since the financial crisis hit Iceland in 2008, China has taken advantage
of the Icelandic government’s desperation in a context of financial strain to
extend its role in the economic life of the country. (25) Beijing’s financial help
was considered invaluable by the current President of Iceland, Ólafur Ragnar
Grímsson, who has visited China five times in the past six years and has pro-
moted Iceland as a potential transhipment centre for transport in the Arc-
tic. (26) China has expressed interest in the Icelandic project. (27)
In April 2012, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao went to Sweden and Ice-
land with the purpose of strengthening economic cooperation and getting
political support for China’s application for permanent observer status in
the Arctic Council. (28) The diplomatic visit took place following Denmark’s
promise to support China. (29) The rising economic presence of China in Ice-
land and Denmark has led to extensive media coverage and concern. This
was particularly the case when Huang Nubo, a rich Chinese entrepreneur,
revealed a significant project of purchasing real estate in Iceland in Novem-
ber 2011. (30) Yet China’s economic cooperation with the Arctic’s two major
regional actors, Canada and the United States, remains limited. China invests
more extensively in Canada’s northern region than it does in its Arctic area.
Among the locations it targets are Alberta’s oil sands, as well as iron mines
in Lake Otelnuk and Lake Duncan in Quebec. The Chinese corporation Jilin
Jien has also invested in the Kangiqsujuaq nickel mine in Nunavik, Quebec.
Washington does not seem as preoccupied with China’s interest in the Arctic
as it is concerned by Beijing’s rising military capacity in East Asia.
Beijing’s cooperation with Russia is increasing in the energy sector. (31) Co-
operation in the Arctic is at the heart of Sino-Russian relations and has been
raised in the context of bilateral discussions about strategic and energy-re-
lated partnerships. Russia controls the Northeast Passage and plans to start
large-scale natural resource extraction in the Arctic region in the short term.
Moscow views China as a possible investment partner in the implementa-
tion of this project. However, resource extraction requires advanced tech-
nological expertise as well as adapted equipment (i.e., drilling rigs), both of
which Russia and China lack. As the Director of the China Arctic and Antarc-
tic Administration, Qu Tanzhou, emphasised, (32) China would only be able
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to extract hydrocarbon in the Arctic with industrial cooperation agreements.
Finally, China and Russia have launched a joint research program to address
technical and technological problems pertaining to the construction of
pipelines in Arctic and subarctic conditions. (33)
Our close look at academic analyses published by mainland scholars and
our overview of Beijing’s scientific activities and diplomatic initiatives in re-
cent years reveal China’s growing interest in the Arctic region. Our findings
also suggest that Beijing is developing a long-term strategy that will enable
it to build itself a political and a logistical base for the promotion of its in-
terests in the Arctic.
China’s official stance on the Arctic
What is Beijing’s official position vis-à-vis the Arctic? To what extent are
China’s recent initiatives and official declarations part of a broader strategy
aimed at promoting China’s economic, scientific, and military development,
and facilitating its access to energy and new trade routes? If a coherent
strategy exists, what are its main components?
Official representatives’ speeches on the Arctic have been expressed with
caution and pertain mostly to climate change and environmental prob-
lems. (34) These declarations reflected China’s willingness to take an active
part in the process of internationalising cooperation in the Arctic. (35) China’s
argument in favour of the latter is based on the United Nations’ Convention
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982), which
was put into place in 1994. UNCLOS states that high sea areas of the Arctic
Ocean are located 200 nautical miles (320 km) beyond the coast of its bor-
dering countries. These 200 miles are part of each bordering country’s ex-
clusive economic zones (EEZ). Coastal countries are not sovereign in these
zones, but have sovereign rights over resources of the water column, on the
sea bed and under the seafloor.
Arctic countries have sovereign rights over the continental shelf. Article
76 of UNCLOS claims that a country’s continental shelf can extend 350
nautical miles (648 km), but cannot exceed 100 nautical miles from a 2,500
metre isobath measuring depth. Moreover, the continental shelf must be a
natural geological extension of the land territory over which the state has
sovereignty. This convention’s clauses are subject to a large number of con-
troversies and disagreements between states seeking to extend their area
of jurisdiction in the Arctic. (36)
Disputes have emerged regarding the scope of such sea spaces and states’
claims over the extension of the continental shelf to the ridges of Lomonossov
and Mendeleïev. Many sources have misleadingly estimated that the latter
might contain more than one fourth of the world’s gas reserves. (37) In reality,
no reliable inventory of Arctic resources has been conducted to this day and
it is estimated that all continental shelves contain only 30 percent of undis-
covered gas resources and 13 percent of undiscovered oil reserves. (38) Further-
more, nearly 95 percent of these reserves are found within EEZs. (39) Hence,
based on the current state of research findings, hydrocarbon fields on conti-
nental shelves would actually remain significantly limited. (40)
Beijing’s declarations with respect to hydrocarbon deposit drilling in the
Arctic are vague and as yet infrequent. As such, in his overview of China’s
activities in the region, the director of the political and planning division of
the Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration, Xu Shijie, excluded the
drilling of hydrocarbon deposits from China’s future foreign policy objectives
in the Arctic. Mr. Xu had earlier affirmed, “Since there is no reliable infor-
mation on oil and gas reserves in the Arctic, China’s interest in the latter
region is primarily oriented around climate change. Whatever policy position
China adopts on the matter will necessitate information about the Arctic’s
mineral and oil potential.” (41)
The Chinese government does not deny its interest in the opening of new
trade routes in the Arctic Ocean. Exports play a crucial role in China’s eco-
nomic development, and access to new trade routes in the Arctic would
allow China to reduce its dependency on the Strait of Malacca. (42) While
Beijing emphasises openly the significance of such potential future routes
for its economic growth and security in the years to come, it nevertheless
acknowledges that navigation in these waters requires the approval of rel-
evant Arctic countries, including Russia and Canada. (43)
Several scholars in mainland China have maintained that the international
community must respect recommendations by UNCLOS, and that zones
bordering Arctic countries should be open to all countries. (44) Such a change
could facilitate China’s access to the Arctic. More particularly, Admiral Zhuo
Yin has been cited frequently since he stated that “the Arctic belongs to all
people of the world and no states should have sovereignty rights over it.” (45)
The admiral nevertheless failed to specify which sea spaces his comment
referred to. Moreover, it remained unclear whether Zhuo Yin’s radical stance
published by the China News Service Agency also represented the official
position of the Chinese government.
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In spite of the obvious absence of any officially articulated stance on the
part of China, Beijing’s growing interest in the Arctic is reflected in a large
number of mainland Chinese scholars’ unrestrained discussions on the sub-
ject. (46) Many embrace the hypothesis that Arctic ice floes will have melted
entirely by 2030 and believe that China should push forward its policy in
an upcoming international struggle over control of the Arctic. Priorities are
given to the extraction of natural resources and access to the new economic
opportunities that a new trade route would generate in the region. As such,
according to Li Zhenfu, a professor from Dalian Maritime University, “Those
who will control navigation in the Arctic will also control future opportuni-
ties for economic development and international decisions.” (47)
Mainland Chinese scientists have encouraged their government to change
its position of neutrality and passive attitude vis-à-vis the Arctic by taking
part in the process of delineating the areas of sovereignty and sharing of
natural resources in that part of the world. These scholars have nonetheless
failed to specify on what legal grounds such a policy would be conducted.
According to the director of the Centre for Strategic Studies at the Polar
Research Institute of China, “Being one of the largest energy consumers,
China must improve its status in the Arctic and explore cooperation oppor-
tunities proactively with countries in the region. […] Based on International
Law, the Arctic does not belong to any particular country [...]. However,
countries bordering the region have ambitiously sought to expand their in-
fluence in that part of the world, which until now has been free. [...] China
must thus turn to the international community and show its capacity and
determination to defend its interests in the area of natural resource extrac-
tion and the development of trade routes in the Arctic.” (48)
Such bold opinions on the part of mainland researchers have been pub-
lished not only in conventional academic journals but also in newspapers,
usually known for refraining from publishing opinion pieces that are unau-
thorised ahead of time. The Anglophone journal of the China Institute of In-
ternational Studies under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs published an article
on China’s stakes in the Arctic, in which the authors provide a detailed jus-
tification for China’s right to take part in Arctic affairs, and urge the Chinese
government to formulate a coherent policy in that regard. (49) According to
investigators from the School of International Relations and Public Affairs
at Fudan University in Shanghai, the Chinese government must “develop a
holistic approach and a well defined national strategy in the Arctic in the
medium and long-term; [it must] include the protection and expansion of
China’s interests and rights in the Arctic in the country’s overall develop
strategy.” (50)
In China, where published information is monitored (and if necessary, cen-
sored) by the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP, all articles must
go through an editorial and political filter prior to publication in the pages
of magazines and newspapers. (51) The fact that bold and incautious opinions
by mainland investigators about China’s strategy in the Arctic have been
authorised in national newspapers and major academic journals could be
indicative of Beijing’s willingness to become an active player in the region.
The increase in such articles in the print media and Chinese news websites
might also be part of an attempt to prepare public opinion for this possibil-
ity. Furthermore, the government has allowed a section of the National Mu-
seum’s permanent exhibition to be dedicated to China’s exploration of the
Arctic (see picture 2). The exhibition is entitled “The Road to Revival” – 
(fuxing zhi lu复兴之路) – and provides an overview of the development of
the revolutionary movement in China since the nineteenth century, sum-
marising the Chinese people’s great accomplishments under the guidance
of the CCP. The exhibition’s stand on the Arctic and Antarctic is located be-
tween those on China’s space program and nuclear weapon testing. This
N o . 2 0 1 2 / 3  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 65
46. Li Zhenfu, “Diyuan zhengzhi zhili lilun yanbian yu Beiji hangxian diyuan zhengzhi lilun jiashe” (The
Evolution of geopolitical theory and geopolitical hypotheses on Arctic maritime routes), Shijie Dili
Yanjiu, vol. 19, no. 1, 2010, pp. 6-13; Zhang Shengjun, Li Xing, “Zhongguo nengyuan anquan yu
Zhongguo Beiji zhanluë dingwei” (China’s energy security and geopolitical position in the Arctic),
Guoji guancha (International review), no. 4, pp. 64-71.
47. Linda Jakobson, “China Prepares for an Ice-Free Arctic,” art. cit., pp. 6.
48. See Zhu Shanshan, “Arctic competition heats up as ice melts,” Global Times, 2011, www.global-
times.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/666783/Arctic-competition-heats-
up-as-ice-melts.aspx www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/articleType/ArticleView/articleId
/666783/Arctic-competition-heats-up-as-ice-melts.aspx(consulted on 7 August 2012); “Arctic
nations should warm to other powers,” Global Times, 2011, www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/
tabid/99/ID/669098/Arctic-nations-should-warm-to-other-powers.aspx (consulted on 7 August
2012).
49. Qin Qian, Chen Yugang, “The Post-Cold War International Cooperation in the Arctic Region,” China
International Studies, September/October Issue, 2011, pp. 138-155.
50. Ibid, pp. 154.
51. Dominique Colomb, Médias et communication en Chine. Au-delà des paradoxes (Media and com-
munication in China: Beyond paradoxes), Paris, L’Harmattan, 2008.
Olga V. Alexeeva and Frédéric Lasserre – The Snow Dragon: China’s Strategies in the Arctic
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Picture 3: Flag of China’s Arctic mission autographed by its
participants, National Museum of China, Beijing, 
14 December 2012.
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suggests the symbolic significance given to China’s activities in the Arctic.
The museum is free of charge and attracts 4 million visitors annually. It is
not only a window on China but also constitutes a significant instrument
of political and historical education. (52)
It would be surprising for mainland Chinese investigators’ position on
China’s strategy in the Arctic to become official. Historically, Beijing has
emphasised the principle of non-interference in third parties’ claims over
territorial sovereignty. Since the 1950s, this principle had become very pop-
ular among newly independent states liberated from colonisation. China
has justified its rejection of third-party interference by emphasising the de-
structive effects of foreign intervention in the economic and political affairs
of other countries. (53) In spite of its emphasis on non-interference, China
claims that straits stretching from north to west in the Arctic are interna-
tional property. If so, Canada could make a similar statement, affirming that
the Qiongzhou Strait, located between Hainan and mainland China, also
belongs to the international community. China nevertheless denies that.
Similarly, Beijing has sought to justify its claims over the South and East
China seas. If the extension of China’s maritime access in Asia is legitimate,
why would that of Canada and other bordering countries in the Arctic not
be?
As such, although Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu Zhengyue declared
that “China did not have a policy towards the Arctic” during a conference
held in Spitsbergen in November 2009, (54) local sources suggest that China
is developing a well-defined strategy to further its interests in the region.
The latter would comprise the following four components:
1. Strengthening scientific field research to legitimise China’s growing
presence in the region;
2. Developing relations with countries neighbouring the Arctic Ocean;
3. Consolidating coordination between non-Arctic countries to find com-
mon interests to defend and promote internationally in the region;
4. Developing a strategy towards the North and making it a part of China’s
global development program.
The above components constitute only the broad lines of China’s policy
towards the Arctic. The details of the policy, along with its short- and long-
term objectives, practical implications, and geopolitical consequences, have
yet to be fleshed out. At the very least, China seems determined to challenge
sovereignty claims over the maritime space of countries neighbouring the
Arctic Ocean.
Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic
While China is not a circumpolar state, it nevertheless seeks to develop
closer ties with countries neighbouring the Arctic by strengthening its eco-
nomic and geopolitical presence in the region. A series of agreements signed
with Denmark and Iceland since 2000 are indicative of Beijing’s increasingly
explicit interest in countries that could become important centres in the
Arctic’s maritime transit zones in the long run. Similar motivations are at
the heart of China’s relations with Russia, which controls Arctic transit from
north to east and plans to explore natural resources in the Arctic zone. The
development of energy cooperation with Russia in the region constitutes
one of Beijing’s priorities. Such cooperation would provide China with le-
gitimate access to the Arctic, including trade routes and natural resource
extraction opportunities. According to mainland Chinese experts, Russia
would constitute one of the main points of entry for Chinese companies
wishing to explore the Arctic’s energy and maritime access opportunities
in the near future. (55) The Chinese government has already signed a certain
number of cooperation agreements with some Russian Arctic regions. For
instance, in Yakutia, located in the northeast of Siberia, China is financing
the opening of a trade corridor through the Northeast Passage between the
Ziryanka coal mine in the district of Verkhoyansk and Shanghai. In the short-
term, the new corridor will allow Russia to provide China with 60,000 tons
of coal annually. (56) While this volume represents a very small proportion of
China’s total coal consumption, the initiative nonetheless reflects China’s
efforts to deepen its relations with Russia and Yakutia’s search for new com-
mercial openings. China attributes significant importance to its energy and
economic partnership with Russia in the Arctic zone. The following discus-
sion delves into the details of such cooperation.
The broad lines of Sino-Russian cooperation were defined in the Sino-
Russian Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation signed
in 2001. This agreement marked both countries’ willingness to ensure each
other’s security and mutual trust, and to undertake cooperative initiatives
based on the principle of reciprocity, especially in the energy sector. (57) The
last agreement signed between Russian President Dmitry Medevdev and
Chinese President Hu Jintao on 23 September 2009 was also meant to
strengthen both countries’ economic cooperation. The agreement entitled
“Program of Cooperation between the Regions of the Far East and Eastern
Siberia and the Northeast of the People’s Republic of China, 2009-2018”
includes 205 major bilateral projects meant to bring Sino-Russian cooper-
ation to a higher level than ever before.
All the projects on Russian territory pertain to the extraction of deposits
of all kinds, including coal, iron ore, precious metal remains, apatites, and
molybdenum in Eastern Siberia. The extraction of raw materials will be fi-
nanced by Chinese funds and conducted by a mainland Chinese labour force.
The latter will come from the north-eastern provinces neighbouring Russia,
which have been greatly affected by unemployment as a result of the shut-
down of many state-owned enterprises. Once extracted, raw materials will
be transported to China’s north-eastern region and transformed into end
products. The Chinese government will create a large number of factories
in China specialising in the production of tin, lead, copper sheets, bricks, etc.
As such, Sino-Russian cooperation in the next ten years will involve the ex-
change of Russian raw materials with Chinese funds, technology, and labour.
Sino-Russian cooperation projects in the Arctic will follow a similar logic
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and are crucial components of each country’s foreign policy. Russia seeks
to diversify its oil consumers to reduce its dependency on the West. (58) In
order to reach these objectives, Moscow must not only develop a trans-
portation network on its territory and open alternative trade routes, but
also start extracting rich deposits in its Arctic zones, including in the Yamal
Peninsula. The latter would eventually replace existing sources of extraction
in Siberia that are in decline. (59) As such, Russia’s Gazprom plans to start ex-
tracting before 2030 a certain number of offshore deposits in the Arctic, in-
cluding in the Barents, Okhotsk, Kara, and Pechora seas. These projects will
enable the country to increase its gas production by 11 billion tonnes of oil
equivalent. (60) From the perspective of Beijing, eager to intensify and diver-
sify its imports of hydrocarbon resources for economic growth purposes,
Russia constitutes an ideal provider due to its proximity and the abundance
of its oil and gas deposits. China’s interest in taking an active part in most
of Russia’s energy-related projects at the national and regional levels sup-
ports claims that the Russian and Chinese economies supplement one an-
other. (61)
In 2009, the Russian state oil company Rosneft announced the launch of
a project of development and extraction of 30 new oil sites in the Arctic
and offshore zones. Nevertheless, the company needs funding for the proj-
ect. It also requires the oil extraction technology to drill to the bottom of
deep oceans in extreme climate conditions and areas that are hard to ac-
cess. (62) Russia is particularly lagging behind in this area compared with oil-
rich Western countries. (63) These considerations have pushed Moscow to
search for partnerships abroad, including in China. Three Chinese companies
have offered to provide the necessary resources and labour: China National
Petroleum Corporation, China National Offshore Oil Corporation, and China
Petroleum & Chemical Corporation Limited. According to the Russian media,
bilateral discussions are currently taking place to establish to what extent
China will participate in the project.
Most of the oil and gas Russia plans to extract in the Arctic will target the
Asian market, and most particularly China. (64) Oil transportation will thus
be at the core of Sino-Russian discussions. (65) Relevant deposits are not yet
connected to Russian pipeline systems, but the Russian companies Transneft
and Gazprom plan to build some in the future. (66) The need to build adequate
infrastructure and facilities (i.e., specialised refineries for heavy crude oil) to
transform oil into marketable products prompted Russia to study more
closely the potential opening of new navigation routes in the North. (67) The
first time Russian oil was shipped to China through the Northern Sea Route
was in August 2010. Tanker Baltica was accompanied by an icebreaker and
took 27 days to deliver 70,000 tons of natural gas condensate from Mur-
mansk to Ningbo, a city located in north-eastern Zhejiang Province.
This first attempt was followed by the signing of a long-term cooperation
agreement in the area of Arctic navigation between Russia’s shipping com-
pany Sovcomflot and China National Petroleum Corporation in November
2010. This agreement was officially declared an integral part of China and
Russia’s strategic energy cooperation, and was signed in the presence of Igor
Sechin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and symbolic Pres-
ident of Rosneft’s management board, as well as Wang Qishan, Vice-Premier
of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China. This agreement spec-
ifies the procedures behind the joint usage of the Northeast Passage for
transit or oil transportation purposes. In 2011, many bulk carriers trans-
ported iron ore from Murmansk and Kirkenes (Norway) to Chinese ports by
going through the Northern Sea Route, and many other ships transported
methane and oil between Vitino and China. More than 600,000 tons of con-
densate were exported to Asia via the Northern Sea Route in 2011. (68) Be-
yond the diversification of opportunities for transit, China is interested in
the access to natural resources that the Arctic may provide. (69)
The Maritime Administration of the Russian Federation plans to launch a
new large-scale national program, the objective of which would be to create
favourable conditions for the use of a new transport corridor in the near fu-
ture. (70) The program involves several steps:
• The development of port facilities along the Northern Sea Route
(ports of Indiga, Pechenga, and Varandey on the coasts of the Barents
Sea, port facilities in the Yamal Peninsula, etc.) and modernisation of
existing ports (Khatanga, Tiksi, Pevek, Dudinka, and Dikson);
• The repair of existing Russian Arctic vessels and construction of a se-
ries of new-generation icebreakers, including some nuclear-powered
polar models;
• The conduct of large-scale hydrographic work to collect precise tech-
nical and geographical information to ensure safe navigation in rele-
vant Arctic zones;
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• The modernisation of the emergency intervention system in Arctic
waters and the creation of a research and rescue centre in Tiksi, to
monitor navigation zones and coordinate rescue operations. (71)
China has expressed interest in being part of the above program and broad-
ening its cooperation with Moscow in the Russian Arctic zone. (72) Among the
proposals made by Beijing is its financial support of the opening of navigation
routes in the Arctic, the identification and evaluation of natural resource re-
serves in the region, and scientific cooperation. China will participate in the
construction and launch of floating nuclear plants in the Arctic. The latter
will be placed along sea and river shorelines to provide newly built ports and
commercial bases along the Northeast Passage with necessary energy. (73)
The Chinese government hopes that Russia will authorise Chinese scien-
tific aircraft to fly over its territory in the Arctic and enable its scientists to
work in Russian Arctic stations. (74) However, the potential for Sino-Russian
cooperation in the area of natural resource extraction in the Arctic triggers
several questions. How far have China and Russia actually cooperated in
the Arctic up to now? Will Russia be able to implement its ambitious Arctic
development program? What would be China’s actual role in that process?
Would the program result in the extension of both countries’ strategic part-
nership or translate into a new bilateral agreement of some kind? Vladimir
Putin, who was recently re-elected as Russia’s President, seems determined
to orient Russia’s foreign policy in the latter direction by promoting the de-
velopment of Sino-Russian ties and joint cooperation in the Arctic. As such,
the first official visit by Putin following his re-election as President was to
China in June 2012.
Conclusion
In spite of China’s growing presence in the Arctic and its past implemen-
tation of research projects in the area, Beijing only recently and implicitly
expressed claims over access to the region. China has gradually developed
and implemented a coherent policy to secure its interests in that region.
On the one hand, it has launched a vast scientific polar research program
and promoted the diffusion of knowledge about the Arctic for policy-related
purposes. On the other hand, it has established durable economic and po-
litical relations with circumpolar countries by taking an active part in inter-
national debates about the Arctic and its role in world development.
Ultimately, China has succeeded in becoming one of the main actors on the
Arctic scene in spite of its lack of geographical access to the region. China’s
priorities reveal its rising international ambitions to be heard on matters
pertaining to Arctic governance and to have access to the region’s natural
resources through market mechanisms, questions that remain the heart of
disagreements between Russia and Canada.
Many questions regarding China’s role and interest in the Arctic have yet
to be answered. Whether mainland Chinese scientists’ positions on China’s
involvement in the region are also those of the Chinese government requires
clarification. Moreover, what are the practical implications and conse-
quences of Beijing’s strategy towards the Arctic? Are there undisclosed
facets of Beijing’s policy towards the region? Is the policy in line with China’s
other geopolitical and energy-related priorities? More quantitative and qual-
itative data is needed to answer these questions, better grasp China’s Arctic
strategy, and anticipate its evolution in the near future. These questions are
at the heart of our current research and will be the object of our next field-
work trips in China.
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